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Three hypotheses are discussed as explanations for the result that pairs of concrete nouns are
more easily remembered than are pairs of abstract nouns: the imagery hypothesis, the famil-
iarity hypothesis, and the concreteness hypothesis. Two experiments are reported in which the
degree of visual imagery associated with the components of paired associate items was not in-
dicative of the degree of visual imagery experienced during their learning or with the accuracy
with which they were recalled. It was found that pairs of related abstract nouns were rated
higher in imagery and familiarity than were pairs of unrelated concrete nouns, but recall of the
higher imagery pairs was poorer. The concreteness hypothesis is discussed as the best explana-
tion for the results. The concreteness hypothesis proposes that people learn to associate the
labels of concrete objects by using their real-world knowledge of the potential relations between
categories of objects. Dual coding theory and schema theory are also discussed as explanations
for mediation learning, and the issue of visual imagery as an epiphenomenon is addressed.
The study of visual imagery is an important aspect of
contemporary cognitive psychology. Imagery seems to
play an important role in the manner in which informa-
tion is represented in memory (Kosslyn, 1980; Paivio,
1971, 1977, 1978) and in the manner in which new
information is remembered. Recent discussion of visual
imagery has focused primarily on the representational
characteristics of imagery (J. R. Anderson, 1978; Kosslyn
& Pomerantz, 1977; Paivio, 1977, 1978; Pylyshyn,
1973).
In addition, people can use visual imagery mediation
as a strategy to associate information in memory (Bower,
1972; Paivio, 1969, 1971). For example, when pre-
sented the noun pair "truck-apple," a person can use the
learning strategy of forming a visual image of a truck
running over an apple. Later, when only the cue, "truck,"
is presented, the image previously formed can be retrieved
from memory and decoded into the correct response,
"apple." Formation of a visual image of the referents
of a pair interacting in some way is the reason some-
times given for why learning occurs. Visual imagery as
the cause of learning will be referred to here as the
imagery hypothesis. Hence, visual imagery is important
both as a model of representing information in memory
and as a strategy for learning new information. The
purpose of the experiments reported here was to look
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more closely at the nature of learning using visual
imagery mediation.
Although visual imagery has come to play an impor-
tant role in theories of mediated learning, there are
situations in which the amount ofvisual imagery reported
by subjects is not indicative of the degree of learning
that takes place. In a series of experiments, Bellezza
and Day (Note 1) demonstrated that both letters of the
alphabet and nouns representing concrete objects are
rated high in visual imagery. However, when composite
images were formed for pairs of letters and concrete
nouns in a paired associate learning task, the imagery
ratings for the letter-noun pairs were significantly lower
than the ratings for the noun-noun pairs. Furthermore,
the letter-noun pairs were not recalled as well as the
noun-noun pairs. These results show that the imagery
ratings of the individual components of a pair do not
always indicate the degree of imagery experienced when
the components are formed into a composite image.
The Familiarity Hypothesis and
the Concreteness Hypothesis
The imagery hypothesis indicates that the formation
of a vivid composite image will result in good perfor-
mance in a paired associate learning task. Also, it implies
that high-imagery components will result in high imagery
for the presented pair (Bower, 1972; Paivio, 1971).
Consequently, the imagery hypothesis does not seem to
be able to account for the results of Bellezza and Day
(Note I). Since the letters and nouns used by Bellezza
and Day were rated equally high in imagery, subjects
should have been able to form interacting images using
them.
A possible explanation for the low levels of learning
that occurred in the Bellezza and Day (Note 1) experi-
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ments is that people have little prior experience of
letters of the alphabet interacting with physical objects.
Therefore, associating letters and objects is difficult.
Little prior knowledge exists in memory that involves
physical objects interacting with letters of the alphabet,
yet this interaction seems to be necessary for learning by
visual imagery mediation (Bower, 1972; Wollen, Weber,
& Lowry, 1972). This is the familiarity hypothesis. It
suggests that learning by visual imagery mediation makes
use of composite images based on the learner's experi-
ence. The letters of the alphabet are simply visual
symbols. Therefore, composite visual images involving
letters and physical objects interacting are difficult to
form, and the pairs are difficult to remember. Recall of a
letter and a physical object is not likely to be redinte-
grative (Horowitz & Prytulak, 1969) in the sense that
the two items in the image cannot be represented by a
single event in memory. When presented with an easily
learned word pair such as "clown-dog," a person might
remember a specific experience of a clown and a dog
doing tricks together at a circus. By remembering this
specific episode, the learner retrieves sensory-perceptual
information connected with the episode and thereby
experiences visual imagery. The visual imagery indicates
that information is available in memory that can relate
the two words in the presented pair.
The familiarity hypothesis, however, does not seem
to be able to account for all mediated learning and its
accompanying visual imagery. For example, many
people can form a composite image for the word pair
"Eskimo-dinosaur." Yet, few people think about an
Eskimo and a dinosaur together until the pair is pre-
sented. To form a visual image, it seems likely that
people first retrieve from memory some of the classes
and categories of objects to which Eskimo and dinosaur
belong. For example, an Eskimo belongs to the more
general category "man," and a dinosaur belongs to the
category "large animal." The generic knowledge regard-
ing men and large animals and the sensory-perceptual
information specific to Eskimos and dinosaurs enable
the person to form a visual image. This is the concrete-
ness hypothesis. It proposes that learning by visual
imagery mediation is based on general knowledge of how
classes of concrete objects interact in the physical world.
A man may ride a large animal, a man may kill a large
animal, a man may be trampled by a large animal, a man
may feed a large animal, and so on. The referents of
concrete nouns have attributes that are often compatible
with each other. Hence, the composite visual image
formed is dependent on knowledge about how classes
of concrete objects interact in the physical world and is
not dependent on personal experience with the two'
specific objects interacting.
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to try to manipu-
late both the factors of familiarity of word pairs (related-
ness) and their concreteness. A determination was then
made of the degree to which each of these two factors
contribute to imagery ratings and recall performance.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, both abstract- and concrete-noun
pairs were used. In this manner, the factor of concrete-
ness was manipulated. In addition, half of the pairs used
contained nouns judged to be related and the other
half contained unrelated nouns. It was expected that
this factor of relatedness would indicate the degree to
which the composite images formed for the pairs would
be familiar or unfamiliar. If concreteness is the primary
factor in learning, then the only result should be that
concrete-noun pairs are recalled better than abstract-
noun pairs. If familiarity is the primary factor in learn-
ing, then the only result should be that the related pairs
are recalled better than the unrelated pairs. These two
alternative outcomes represent ideal solutions to the
problem. A more likely result is that both factors are
significant to some degree. Therefore, one of the sta-
tistical analyses performed in Experiment 1 was to
compute a ratio between the amount of variance in the
recall measure accounted for by the two factors of
concreteness and familiarity.
To gather additional evidence about the degree to
which subjects were drawing upon prior experience
when imaging and learning the pairs, the subjects
described the composite image formed for each pair,
the image's vividness and clarity were rated, its famil-
iarity was rated, and, fmally, the subject had to indicate
where he or she thought the image originated. Was it
purely imaginary, or was it based on a picture in a book,
a magazine, a movie, a TV show, and so on? It was
hoped that these descriptive data would provide some
insights about the degree to which the images formed
were based on the relations between the categories to
which the words belonged and on the specific experi-
ences of which the subjects were reminded.
Method
Subjects. A total of 71 students enrolled in introductory
psychology courses at Ohio University volunteered to participate
for extra course credit.
Materials. Twenty-four word pairs were made up such that 12
of the pairs contained nouns representing concrete objects and
12 of the pairs contained nouns that were abstract. Further-
more, six pairs of each type were made up of seemingly unre-
lated nouns (brain-pipe, happiness-opinion) and six pairs of each
type were made up of seemingly related nouns (student-book,
joy-victory). All the words used occurred at least 50 times per
million in the Thorndike and Lorge (1944) general frequency
count. The imagery ratings (Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan, 1968)
for the abstract nouns ranged from 2.13 to 5.60, and those for
the concrete nouns ranged from 5.93 to 6.73.
Procedure. In the first part of the experiment, a group of
44 subjects rated the relatedness of the two nouns in each of the
24 pairs using a 5-point rating scale in which "5" meant that the
words were very related and "1" meant that the words were
very unrelated. Subjects were told to rate these pairs on the
basis of how closely related the meaning of one word was to the
meaning of the other. A 2 by 2 analysis of variance was per-
formed on the mean relatedness ratings provided for each type
of pair by each of the 44 subjects. The two factors were word
concreteness and word relatedness, and both were within-
subjects factors. As expected, pairs intended to be unrelated
were rated lower than pairs intended to be related [Ft l ,43) =
773.84, P < .001, MSe = .379]. The mean ratings were 1.34
and 3.92, respectively. Also, abstract words were generally rated
as somewhat more related than concrete words [[-0,43) =8.97,
p<.005, MSe=.107], with means of 2.70 and 2.55, respec-
tively. These 'results indicated that people perceived the unre-
lated pairs asmade up of unrelated nouns and the related pairs as
made upof related nouns.
In the second part of the experiment, 27 new subjects were
tested individually. The noun pairs were presented oneat a time
on an index card, and the subject was to try to form a com-
posite visual image using the referent images of the words or
images that were associated with each word. Thesubject was also
to describe the composite image formed in oneor two sentences.
Next, the clarity of the composite image was rated by the sub-
ject using a 5-point rating scale on which "5" meant that the
image was Very clear andvivid and" I" meant that no image was
present. The subject also rated the familiarity of the composite
image using a 5-point scale of familiarity on which "5" meant
that the image formed was very familiar and "I" meant that the
image formed was completely unfamiliar to the subject or that
no image was present. If the image was not entirely new, the
subject was asked to indicate where he or she had experienced
that image before.
Each sequence of four pairs contained one of thefour types
of pairs in a random order. After all24 pairs had been presented,
the subjects were given a surprise cued recall test. The first word
of each pair was presented in the same order as the pairs were,
and the subject was to try to recall the second word of the pair.
Both the presentation andthe testing of the pairs were self-paced.
Results
A 2 by 2 analysis of variance was performed on the
mean imagery ratings, on the mean familiarity ratings,
and on the arcsine transformations of the proportion of
words correctly recalled. The two factors were again
noun concreteness and noun relatedness, with both
factors being within-subjects factors. The mean value of
each variable for each of the four types of word pairs is
shown in Table 1.
The analysis of the imagery ratings for the composite
images showed both noun concreteness [F(l ,26) =
12.43, p<.OOS, MSe=.164] and noun relatedness
[F(1 ,26) = 44.81, P < .001, MSe = .275] to be signifi-
cant factors. Concrete-noun pairs were rated as higher
in imagery (4.25) than were abstract-noun pairs (3.98),
and related word pairs (4.45) were also rated higher in
imagery than were unrelated word pairs (3.77). An
Table I
Mean Imagery Ratings, Mean Familiarity Ratings, and
Mean Proportion Recalled for the Four Types of
Pairs Used in Experiment 1
-------
Item Type
Measure AR AU CR CU
Imagery 4.27 3.68 4.63 3.87
familiarity 4.00 3.64 4.30 3.09
Recall .55 .43 .66 .61
------
Note-Au == abstract nouns, related; A V = abstract nouns, unre-
lated; CR = concrete nouns, related; Clf = concrete nouns.
unrelated.
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additional unexpected result was that related abstract
nouns (4.27) were rated significantly higher in imagery
than were unrelated concrete nouns (3.87) [F(l ,26) ==
8.73, p<.Ol, MSe==.249]. As in the experiments
reported by Bellezza and Day (Note 1), the imagery
ratings of the composite images were not determined
solely by the imagery ratings of their components.
The analysis of variance on the familiarity ratings of
the composite images showed noun relatedness to be a
significant factor [F(1,26) == 62.20, p < .001, MSe ==
.267], but not noun concreteness. The images formed
from related nouns were rated 4.15 on the 5.point
familiarity scale, and the unrelated nouns, 3.37. How-
ever, the Noun Concreteness by Noun Relatedness inter-
action was also significant [F(l ,26) == 19.70, P < .001,
MSe = .256]. As in the case of the imagery ratings, the
mean familiarity rating for pairs of related abstract
nouns was significantly greater than the mean famil-
iarity rating for pairs of unrelated concrete nouns
[F(l,26) == 44.02, P< .001, MSe == .256].
Analysis of the transformed proportions of response
words correctly recalled showed noun concreteness to
be significant [F(I ,26) = 36.87, P < .001, MSe = .058].
For the concrete pairs, .64 of the response words were
correctly recalled, whereas for the abstract pairs, the
proportion was .49. Noun relatedness was also signifi-
cant [F(1,26) == 26.28, P < .001, MSe = .028]. Of the
related pairs, .60 were correctly recalled, and of the
unrelated pairs, .52. The Noun Concreteness by Noun
Relatedness interaction was also significant [F(1,26) ==
4.90, P < .05, MSe = .023]. Somewhat surprisingly,
the unrelated concrete pairs were recalled better (.61)
than were the related abstract nouns (.55) [F(I ,26) ==
8.00, p < .01, MSe = .023], even though the related
abstract pairs were rated significantly higher in imagery
and familiarity.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 produced an unexpected
pattern of means on the imagery. familiarity, and recall
measures. The most interesting result was that the
imagery and familiarity ratings for related abstract
pairs were significantly higher than those for unrelated
concrete pairs. However, for the recall measure, just the
opposite effect was found. The unrelated concrete pairs
were recalled better. This result seems to separate recall
performance both from the amount of imagery experi-
enced during learning and from the amount of specific
episodic knowledge drawn upon during learning. One
might expect that those pairs rated highest in imagery
would be recalled best, but this did not occur. Pairs
whose composite images were rated as most familiar
were not best recalled either. The factor that was the
best indicator of learning was noun concreteness. Hence,
the results of Experiment 1 support the concreteness
hypothesis more than they support either the imagery
hypothesis or the familiarity hypothesis. Although
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pairs of words representing concrete objects resulted in
neither the most imagery nor the most familiar images,
they were learned the best. The basis for learning under
the concreteness hypothesis seems to be that people
have knowledge about how classes of objects in the
physical world can relate to each other. This knowledge
is used as a basis for learning pairs of words representing
concrete objects, even though the specific objects may
not have been experienced together before the experi-
ment.
Although a number of significant interactions were
found in Experiment 1, the main effects of noun con-
creteness and noun relatedness affected the visual imagery
ratings and the proportion of words recalled. Therefore,
the effects of these two independent variables were
compared in the manner planned before the experi-
ment. To obtain an indication of the relative effects of
these two factors on the imagery ratings, the ratio of
the variance of the imagery ratings accounted for by the
two factors was found by computing the ratio of their
variance component values (Kirk, 1968). The ratio of
noun relatedness variance over noun concreteness vari-
ance was 6.44. This indicates that noun relatedness was
more of a determinant of vividness of imagery than was
noun concreteness.
The same ratio was computed for the ratings repre-
senting the familiarity of the images. In this case, the
ratio was 96.10, indicating that noun relatedness
accounted for 96.10 times the variance accounted for
by noun concreteness. In fact, the factor of noun con-
creteness was not a significant determinant of the
familiarity ratings. However, interpretation of these
results is difficult, as mentioned above, because the
Noun Relatedness by Noun Concreteness interaction was
significant.
When the recall results were analyzed, both noun
relatedness and noun concreteness were significant
factors. However, the amount of variance accounted for
by concreteness was about three times that accounted
for by relatedness. This result is the opposite of the
results found for the measures of image vividness and
image familiarity. Noun concreteness accounts for more
recall variance than does noun relatedness. Again, how-
ever, the significant Noun Concreteness by Noun Related-
ness interaction makes any generalization about main
effects difficult.
During presentation of the pairs, subjects indicated
that they recognized a mean of .93 of the images they
formed. The other .07 were labeled as imaginary. They
described .51 as being based on personal experiences,
.23 based on TV and movies, .08 based on magazines
and books, and .11 from other sources. This result
supports the notion that visual images represent
retrieved sensory-perceptual information that has been
previously experienced and stored in memory. Also,
subjects seemed to be able to indicate the source of
these images. The value of .93 is larger than would be
expected if subjects were using their imagination to
create images of interacting nouns that were rated as
unrelated. However, there is no way to determine
whether the subjects were rating the familiarity of the
composite image or were merely rating the familiarity
of the images of the individual components, such as
"Eskimo" and "dinosaur."
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 provided some evidence showing that
degree of visual imagery experienced during learning
may not be indicative of the amount learned. However,
Experiment 1 may be criticized for some methodological
reasons. Only six pairs of each type of pair were used.
Also, the imagery rating task was embedded in a series
of other tasks involving ratings of image familiarity,
image description, and image identification. The purpose
of Experiment 2 was to use a broader range of materials
and a simpler procedure to replicate the most important
result of Experiment 1, that is, the result that the related
abstract noun pairs were rated higher in imagery but
recalled more poorly than were the unrelated concrete
nouns.
Method
Subjects. Eighty-three students enrolled in introductory
psychology courses at Ohio University volunteered to participate
for extra course credit.
Materials. Sixty-four abstract nouns were selected from the
Toglia and Battig (1978) norms, and 32 pairs were formed such
that the two words in each pair were judged by the experi-
menters to be highly related (democracy-liberty). Another
64 nouns were selected from the same source and consisted of
concrete nouns that were formed into 32 pairs that were judged
to be unrelated (cheese-fur). Pairs of words synonymous in
meaning were not used. Abstractness was defined as a rating
less than 4.00 on the 7-point concreteness scale of Toglia and
Battig (1978), and concreteness was defined as a rating greater
than 6.00. All the words were highly meaningful, with a rating
greater than 4.00 on the Toglia and Battig 7-point meaningful-
ness scale.
A group of 42 subjects was used to obtain relatedness ratings
for the 64 pairs of words. The pairs were randomly ordered into
a list, and the subjects were given 10 sec to rate each pair using a
7-point relatedness scale on which "7" indicated that the words
were very much related in meaning and "1" indicated that the
words were completely unrelated in meaning. The mean related-
ness rating for each pair was then computed. The 16 most related
abstract pairs and the 16 least related concrete pairs were
selected for further use. The abstract pairs ranged in relatedness
from 5.50 to 6.50, and the concrete pairs ranged from 1.19 to
1.93.
In addition to these 32 pairs of words. 16 letters were ran-
domly selected from the alphabet and paired with 16 concrete
nouns not used for the noun pairs. These letter-noun pairs were
used to try to replicate the results of Bellezza and Day (Note 1),
which indicated that letter and concrete noun pairs would be
rated lower in imagery and be more poorly recalled than pairs
made up of concrete nouns. All 48 pairs of items were randomly
placed in a list in sets of 3 pairs, with each set containing one of
each of the three types of pairs (related abstract, unrelated
concrete, letter-noun) in random order.
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Note-LC = pairs of letters and concrete nouns; CU = pairs of
unrelated concrete nouns; AR = pairs of related abstract nouns.
Table 2
Mean Imagery Ratings and Proportion of Items Recalled for
the Three Types of Pairs Used in Experiment 2
Procedure. In the first part of the main experiment, 41
subjects were shown the list of 48 pairs at a rate of one pair
every 10 sec and were instructed to form an interacting visual
image of the two items in each pair. After forming an image,
subjects rated the clarity and vividness of that composite image
using a 7-point imagery scale on which "7" represented an image
that was very clear and vivid and "1" indicated that no image
could be formed. The experimenter gave example images for a
related abstract pair and a letter-noun pair. The related abstract
pair was "joy-victory," and the image described consisted of
fans at a basketball game jumping for joy when their team won
a victory. The letter-noun pair used was "A-dog," and the image
described was a dog chewing on the leg of the capital letter A.
Subjects were also instructed to remember each pairing because
they would have to recall the second word from each pair when
shown the first item later on.
A l-rnin distractor task followed the presentation of the
pairs, and then the subjects were tested using the first item from
each pair. These items were again randomly placed in the list in
groups of three, with a random ordering of the three types of
pairs in each group. The list of cue items was printed on a sheet
of paper, and the subjects were paced through this list at a rate
of one cue every 10 sec. After going through the list once, sub-
jects were given extra time to go back and recall any response
words they may have missed.
Results
A one-way analysis of variance was performed on the
mean imagery ratings for the three types of pairs (related
abstract, unrelated concrete, letter-noun). The mean
ratings are shown in Table 2. There was a significant
difference in the imagery ratings for the three types of
pairs [F(2,80) = 61.51, p<.OOl, MSe=.828]. Related
abstract pairs were rated higher in imagery (5.94) than
were either unrelated concrete-noun pairs (4.15) or
letter-noun pairs (3.88). Two a priori contrasts were
tested. The first constrast showed that the mean imagery
rating for the composite images of related abstract
pairs was significantly greater than that for unrelated
concrete pairs [F(1,80) = 37.38, p < .001, MSe = .828].
The second contrast showed that the composite images
of unrelated concrete pairs were rated as significantly
higher in imagery than those for letter-noun pairs
[F( 1,80) = 6.89, P < .025, MSe = .828].
A second one-way analysis of variance was per-
fonned on the mean proportion of response words
recalled from the three types of pairs. These mean pro-
portions are shown in Table 2. Recall for the three types
of pairs was significantly different [F(2,80) = 72.44,
P < .001, MSe = .0201. Unrelated concrete pairs were
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 confirm that word con-
creteness is an important indicator of success in paired
associate learning. Pairs of unrelated concrete nouns
were recalled better than were pairs of related abstract
nouns. These, in turn, were recalled better than pairs
made up of letters and concrete nouns. However, the
imagery ratings of the composite images for the related
abstract nouns were significantly greater than those of
the unrelated concrete nouns. These results support the
concreteness hypothesis more than they do the famil-
iarity hypothesis or the imagery hypothesis. Pairs of
related abstract words were previously judged as related
in meaning. That is, the relation between the two words
was judged as familiar. But these pairs were not recalled
as well as the pairs of concrete nouns judged as unre-
lated. Similarly, the pairs of related abstract nouns were
judged as producing the greatest amount of visual
imagery, but they were not recalled as well as the pairs
of unrelated concrete nouns that were rated lower in
visual imagery. As was reported in Experiment 1, famil-
iarity and degree of imagery may be factors in learning
pairs of verbal units, but the concreteness of the objects
depicted seems to be the most important factor.
The relation between visual imagery and learning
seems to be a strong one (Paivio, 1971), and the purpose
of the experiments presented here was to explore some
of the reasons for this relationship. However, results
were obtained that show that experienced visual imagery
is not always indicative of the amount learned. Our
results seem to indicate that visual imagery is best
thought of not as a causal factor in learning, but rather
as sensory-perceptual information accompanying the
other information retrieved from memory by the pre-
sented pair. This imagery mayor may not be indicative
of how well the presented item will be retained. Further-
more, the prior knowledge upon which the image is
based may be a memory of some specific experienced
event as when one remembers a circus act when pre-
sented with the pair "clown-dog." But this episodic
information does not seem to be necessary for learning.
Learning may also be based on generic knowledge regard-
ing the classes or categories to which the physical
objects named in the pair belong. Presentation of the
recalled more often (.67) than related abstract pairs
(.57), and these items were recalled more often than
letter-noun pairs (.30). Again, two a priori contrasts
were tested. The first contrast showed that unrelated
concrete pairs were recalled more often than related
abstract pairs [F(1 ,80) = 102.7, p < .001, MSe = .020].
The second contrast showed that related abstract pairs
were recalled more often than letter-noun pairs [F(I,80)
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pair "Eskimo-dinosaur" can result in information
being retrieved from memory about the categories
"man" and "large animals" and how they may interact.
Experiments I and 2 showed that pairs of unrelated
object labels may not generate as much imagery as
other types of pairs, but they may be better recalled.
One could argue, of course, that visual imagery is
merely an epiphenomenon accompanying learning and
has nothing functional to do with it (Pylyshyn, 1973;
Ryle, 1949). The evidence presented here provides
support for this position. The presence of visual imagery
is not the reason that learning occurs. However, visual
imagery can sometimes indicate that learning is taking
place and suggest why it is taking place. Furthermore, a
distinction can be made between associated imagery and
schematic imagery. It is possible that a pair of related
abstract words such as "joy-victory" readily elicits
sensory-perceptual information from memory associ-
ated with the presented pair. This image could consist
of fans jumping to their feet in joy after their team won
a victory. However, the abstract information presented
in the pair is not represented in the experienced image
because the words are abstract. This type of imagery can
be characterized only as associated imagery. The image
does not closely represent the information presented in
the pair. When it is recalled, the information in an
associated image cannot be easily decoded into the
original pair of words (Paivio, 1971). When presented a
pair of unrelated concrete words such as "brain-pipe,"
the image created may be less vivid and less likely to be
based on personal experience. But the learner may be
able to use general knowledge relating parts of the body
to physical objects and think of the relation "physical
injury to part of body (brain) caused by physical object
(pipe)." Any image formed for this relation is a schematic
image because components of the image are isomorphic
to the objects denoted by the noun pair. The image can
be decoded when later recalled. This schematic image,
however, may be rated as not as clear and vivid as an
associated image.
This emphasis on concreteness independent of image-
ability can also help explain the results of Jonides, Kahn,
and Rozin (1975), who found that imagery instructions
improved paired associate performance in congenitally
and totally blind subjects. Their results can be better
understood if it is assumed that blind subjects have hap-
tic experience with concrete objects interacting in vari-
ous ways, although they may not have visual images of
them. Their memory of the objects is based on touching
and kinesthetic experiences. The imagery instructions the
blind subjects received during the experiment may have
encouraged them to draw upon their real-world knowl-
edge during learning, although this knowledge was not
gained through the visual modality.
Dual Coding Theory
The account of mediated learning based on real-
world knowledge proposed here may be contrasted to
Paivio's (1971, 1977, 1978) dual coding theory. In
dual coding theory, abstract nouns are represented only
in the linguistic-verbal system, whereas concrete nouns
are represented both in the verbal-linguistic and in the
pictorial-imagery system. In dual coding theory, con-
crete nouns are learned better than abstract nouns
because they become associated in both memory sys-
tems, whereas abstract noun pairs become associated
only in the linguistic-verbal system.
Dual coding theory cannot easily explain the results
presented here and by Bellezza and Day (Note I).
Bellezza and Day found that both letters and words
were rated high in visual imagery, but the letter-noun
pairs were not rated high in imagery and also were not
remembered as well as the concrete-noun pairs. This
result supports the notion that the mode by which
individual items are represented in memory does not
indicate ease of learning. Real-world knowledge of
possible relations between items in a pair is more impor-
tant than their mode of representation in memory.
Using dual coding theory, it is also difficult to explain
why pairs of related abstract nouns elicit greater visual
imagery than do pairs of unrelated concrete nouns.
Again, the emphasis in dual coding theory is on the
nature of the representation of individual nouns, and the
theory can account for neither the imagery nor the recall
performance found here. Because of the importance in
mediated learning of potential relations among com-
ponents, the traditional method of using the meaning-
fulness, discriminability, or imagery attributes of indi-
vidual verbal items to predict ease of learning may be
limited in usefulness. If anyone attribute of individual
nouns is important in predicting recall performance, it
is concreteness. When pairs are made up of concrete
nouns, there is a good chance that the learner has some
knowledge of a relation between the classes of the
physical objects represented by the two nouns. This
knowledge can then be used as mediating information to
associate the pair.
Schema Theory
The type of learning that has been discussed here is
called mediation learning because the learner is instructed
to use prior knowledge as a means of connecting the
items in the pair (Montague, 1972). The learner is some-
times aware of accessing this prior knowledge because he
or she experiences visual images or verbal phrases com-
bining the items presented. However, as argued above,
these experiences may accompany learning but not be
the cause of it. The problem remains of identifying the
cognitive mechanisms that underlie mediation learning.
In recent years, the notion of memory schemata has
begun to develop and play a role in memory theory.
Memory schemata are organized generic knowledge
structures that can influence the comprehension and
retention of new information (R. C. Anderson, 1979;
Bobrow & Norman, 1975; Neisser, 1976; Rumelhart,
1980; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977; Schank, 1980;
Schank & Abelson, 1977). Therefore, schema theory
provides a potential explanation of the mediation
process in paired associate learning.
Noun concreteness also seems to be important in
schema theory. Concepts representing concrete objects
can be bound as variable values in the slots of memory
schemata. In almost all the examples provided ofvariable
values bound by schemata, these variable values repre-
sent concrete objects. Rumelhart and Ortony (1977)
define memory schemata as based on real-world knowl-
edge and not on verbal definitions. Schemata represent
the arrangement of things and not of words, and
schemata themselves are not linguistic. As an example,
Rumelhart and Ortony discuss the schema for the con-
cept "give" as needing variable values representing the
gift, the giver, and the recipient. In a similar manner,
Schank and Abelson (1977) note that the restaurant
script needs values for props such as foods, drinks, and
the objects found in a restaurant. Also, specific people
are needed for the roles of hostess, waiter, customer,
and so on. Perhaps some of the emphasis in schema
theory on relations among real-world objects results
from their use in discussing perception (Minsky, 1975;
Palmer, 1975). For whatever reason, memory schemata
have been used primarily to represent objects, persons,
situations, events, sequences of events, actions, and
sequences of actions. Schemata are concepts but do not
represent relations among words or concepts. Hence,
memory schemata cannot easily be used to relate and
store pairs of related abstract nouns, such as those pre-
sented in Experiments 1 and 2, and cannot easily be
used to learn the pairs of letters and concrete nouns
presented in Experiment 2 and by Bellezza and Day
(Note 1). Unlike dual coding theory, schema theory
emphasizes the importance of relations among objects
in the physical world rather than their mode of repre-
sentation in memory.
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